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Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, ‘ Argentine
Style’
JORGE P. GORDIN Political Science Institut Barcelona D’Estudis
Internacionals
ABSTRACT
This study assesses the explanatory power of two competing views about
intergovernmental fiscal transfers; one emphasizing the traditional neo-
classical approach to federal-subnational fiscal relations and the other
suggesting that transfers are contingent on the political fortunes and
current political vulnerability of each level of government. These models
are tested using data from Argentina, a federation exhibiting one of the
most decentralised fiscal systems in the world and severe imbalances in
the territorial distribution of legislative and economic resources. Over-
represented provinces ruled by governors who belong to parties different
to that controlling the national executive can bring into play their
representational advantages to attract shares of federal transfers beyond
social welfare criteria. This finding suggests that decision makers in
federal countries must pay close heed to the need to synchronize
institutional reforms and fiscal adjustment.
‘ We are hoping that Argentina will make the necessary reforms, the tough decisions necessary to
earn the conﬁdence of some of these international ﬁnancial institutions. The country itself is
going to have to make some tough calls, starting with reforming the relationship between the
provinces and their budgets and the central governments’ (President George W. Bush
().
This cautionary note expressed by President Bush suggesting the pres-
ence and persistence of strong rent-seeking distributional coalitions at the
subnational level is in one important sense correct. Argentina, a country
whose policies of economic adjustment in the early s have won it
international acclaim, has proved unable to restructure its federal system
to address severe imbalances in the intergovernmental fiscal relations.
The overall unsustainable level of subnational debt and the limited
authority of the centre to rein in fiscal discipline lurked underneath
Argentina’s foreign debt default – the world’s largest – and the prema-
ture fall of De La Rua’s elected government in December . As
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Remmer and Wibbels (: ) claim, ‘ insulated from international
pressures and institutionally powerful, subnational politicians in
Argentina have thus demonstrated a capacity not only to mire their own
governmental units in debt and mismanagement, but collectively to
threaten the adjustment policies of the nation as a whole’.
Under the Argentine Constitution, provinces have the right to borrow
and set up their own official banks, thus making the provinces the main
locus of spending decisions. Amounting to veto players in economic
adjustment policies, regional politicians are institutionally endowed to
extract resources from the center with little concern for the potential
impact of their economic decisions on the federation as a whole. More
specifically, observers of Argentina’s political economy have shown that
its regime of federal transfers induces an over-spending bias across
jurisdictions as each province tries to overuse the national common
source of funds (Jones et al. ). Adding to the expansionary bias that
is being generated by the system of intergovernmental grants are soft
budget constraints that manifest themselves in national government’s bail
outs of regional borrowing and debts. The result is a critically weakened
center that resorts to federal transfers to buy off political support but
unable to pursue intergovernmental reforms aimed at improving its
capacity to provide national public goods.
However, in a country where the national constitution grants
the federal government the authority to intervene, be it through the
cancellation of electoral results or imposing the martial law, in the
provinces, this apparent empowerment of subnational actors seems
paradoxical. For instance, a seminal theorist of federalism such as Daniel
Elazar argues that, given the centralisation of political power and
concentration of activity in the national capital, federal arrangements are
facade institutions (Elazar : ). In the same vein, Weingast (: )
claims that the degree of discretion exercised by the Argentinean national
government not only has hindered economic development but also
‘ compromises the independence of local political authority’. More
recently, it is shown that the administrative character of the processes of
decentralization in Argentina bolsters national interests and inhibits any
meaningful redistribution of power to the subnational authorities (Falleti
).
In trying to resolve this empirical puzzle, we also address a general
theoretical question. What actions in fulfilling the economic reform
agenda might either be facilitated or thwarted by particular constellations
of institutional rules and political dynamics? The underlying hypothesis
explored in this study is that the interplay of territorial legislative
over-representation of smaller subnational units and powerful governor-
ships underlies asymmetric bargaining powers, enhancing the role of
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subnational actors representing more votes per capita. In other words,
some provinces are more institutionally-endowed than others to play a
pivotal role in the intergovernmental fiscal arena. This thesis represents
a useful step in systematically addressing the important but heretofore
neglected role of inter-provincial conflict in federal systems. While this
deficiency is not entirely overlooked (e.g. Gibson and Falleti ;
Wibbels ), Riker’s seminal theory of federalism and empirical work
on federal systems such as Australia, where politics is increasingly
dominated by nationally articulated distributional issues (Painter ),
fall short of assessing subnational diversity. Accordingly, identifying the
political conditions that make some provinces more capable than
others in distributive policymaking may shed new light on the putative
(economic) costs of federal governance.
Argentina should provide a particularly useful case for analysing the
effects of partisanship and representation on the geographical allocation
of fiscal resources. Akin to other presidential regimes with bicameral
legislatures such as the United States (Schlesinger ), it possesses
governorships endowed with scores of formal powers such as patronage,
provincial-level veto, administration of programs in districts, and others.
These gubernatorial prerogatives are further reinforced by the organi-
zation of the main political parties with national appeal, the Peronist and
Radical parties, which replicates the federal structure of the state
granting significant power to provincial party bosses. Hence, governors
are also equipped with informal powers such as controlling the nomina-
tion and career paths of legislators representing the provinces in national
institutions with significant policy-making powers (i.e. the Senate) and,
possibly, they amount to veto players in the passing of federal legislative
initiatives. On the other hand, unlike more established federations, the
Argentinean polity looms large as a work in progress. Since the last
democratization process, ‘ constitutional reforms and  electoral
reforms reshaped the subnational electoral map of Argentina, leading to
one of the most diverse, and arguably, complex political systems in the
world’ (Calvo and Micozzi : ). These transformations not only
highlight constitutional malleability but, more importantly from the
vantage point of this study, also they allow us to assess how institutional
complexity rendered by federalism comes to determine distributive fiscal
policies and the resulting success (or sabotage) of reforms intended to
advance social welfare criteria rather than fiscally unsustainable pork-
barrel imperatives.
This article’s central analytical objective, then, is to analyse the role of
subnational politics on the ‘ enigma’ of Argentine economic development.
The precise field of empirical problems on which we focus to test the
conceptual framework is that of politics in the territorial determination of
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financial resources and fiscal authority in Argentina. Our discussion
should provide an understanding of what type of political interferences
affects the policy of transferring revenue to subnational governments, and
why we should expect to see spatial and temporal variation in the
distribution of revenue to lower levels of government. The study proceeds
in the following way: First, we conduct institutional analysis on the effects
of malapportionment on fiscal policy to unravel the political framework
in which federal transfers takes place, aiming to contextualise the political
consequences of territorial representation in Argentina and the concomi-
tant role of provincial governors. Subsequently, we lay out several
hypotheses to explain variation, both spatial and temporal, in the
allocation of federal/central government grants to subnational govern-
ments in Argentina. After conducting panel-corrected standard errors
regression analyses with pooled data, cross-sectional analysis is conducted
to explain the inter-provincial distribution of transfers in , a year
of extreme fiscal distress in Argentina. We then offer some general
conclusions in the final section.
‘ Patronage-Preserving Federalism?’: Malapportionment and its eﬀects
Barry Weingast () developed the concept of market-preserving
federalism to connote systems in which decentralized control over the
economy by subnational governments within a common market pre-
cludes the central government from encroaching on the political and
economic rights of its citizens. This arrangement underpins fiscal
responsibility, providing no incentives for the constituent parts to overuse
the common pool of federal economic resources. While acknowledging
that this notion is insightful to explain the political economy of the
United States, the world’s oldest federation, we offer an alternative
scenario whereby fiscal decentralisation under particular institutional
conditions does not bear out Weingast and associates’ predictions.
Drawing on previous work questioning the validity of the market-
preserving federalism model for explaining the politics of developing
countries, we argue that asymmetries of representation do not only
influence the ‘ costs’ of cajoling support in the legislature but also they
may have a decisive effect on the coalition-building efforts of executives
at the central and subnational level (Rodden ; Wibbels : –).
It is already well documented that in federal systems, where territorial
representation is juxtaposed to population representation, unequal rep-
resentation of subnational units is commonplace. Partly as a ‘ built-in’
feature of federalism aimed at redressing economic and demographic
vulnerability of smaller jurisdictions, these are deliberately (i.e. constitu-
tionally) over-represented in the Senate. As Rodden (, ) cogently
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shows, this arrangement has substantial effects on public policy because
state representatives are well aware of the distributional consequences of
intergovernmental bargains, particularly when the centre is beholden to
certain fiscally-troubled over-represented subnational governments and
thus unable to change the political institutions that create bad incentives.
In sum, while this contention holds for most federations, we will argue
that, given its egregious nature and based on the significant policy-
making powers of the senate, legislative overrepresentation in Argentina
stands out as a decisive independent variable to explain the ability of
transfer-dependent provinces to thwart fiscal co-responsibility and thus
the paucity of fiscal decentralisation reforms.
What difference does malapportionment make with respect to the
apportionment of federal transfers? Argentina in theory follows the US
constitutional formula of bicameral ‘ symmetry of policy scope’ (Stepan
: ). While symmetry denotes that both houses are equally
important and that the consent of both houses is necessary for most
important decisions (Tsebelis and Money : –), there are some
policy areas in which they have greater prerogatives. The lower house
has greater authority in originating money bills, general tax laws, troop
recruitment and others. The senate, on the other hand, is in charge of
approving presidential nominees and advisors, authorizing the president
to declare a coup d’etat in case of foreign military attack and appoint
judges that assess federal expenditures. More crucially from the perspec-
tive of our study, all revenue-sharing bills (including federal transfers)
must originate in the senate. Additional senatorial prerogatives can be
cited at length, but the encapsulation of fiscal decentralization issues at
the Senate level suffice to highlight why this house is the institutional
point of reference to uncover the politicization of these issues. While
we concur with scholars showing that Argentina has a highly
malapportioned lower chamber as well (Gibson at al ), it ranks in
the th position among the twenty most-malapportioned lower cham-
bers compared to the Senate’s top position in its respective ranking
(Samuels and Snyder : –). Additionally, our focusing on the
Senate stems from the fact the Argentine Congress resorts to the navette
system, which gives the originating house the upper hand in case of
inter-house discrepancy (Tsebelis and Money : –). This per-
ception of the policy-making scope of the Senate is confirmed by a
recent cross-national survey of bicameralism in nine Latin American
countries, concluding that Argentina ranks as the most symmetrical
bicameral system in the region and thus ‘ the senate is constitutionally
equipped to act as an actual ‘ veto player’ insofar as it can delay lower
house legislation at ease and eventually generate legislative paralysis’
(Llanos : ).
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Further, cross-national evidence suggests that senate’s unequal represen-
tation of subnational units shapes legislators’ strategies for pursuing distribu-
tive policy agendas. However obvious this argument may appear, a large
part of the scholarly work on US legislative politics has downplayed the
effect of senate apportionment on coalition building. For instance, Riker’s
seminal notion of minimum-winning coalitions tells us more about the rules of
the game than about asymmetries in the composition of winning coalitions.
Drawing on this thesis, formal theory scholars have not paid sufficient heed
to the pervasive small-state advantages in the distribution of federal funds
(Atlas et al. ). Lee and Oppenheimer (in Lee : ) provide a
convincing explanation for this legislative outcome: ‘ Apportionment shapes
Senate distributive policy-making for two reasons. First, senators represent-
ing small states have more to gain from procuring a given amount of federal
dollars than do senators who represent larger states. A federal grant of $
million, for example, has a far greater effect in Wyoming than in California.
Such a grant yields greater electoral benefits for senators who represent
small states, both in terms of their statewide visibility and the percentage of
residents benefited. . . . Second, Senate apportionment affects the incentives
of coalition builders in distributive policymaking. The tremendous differ-
ences in state population create a unique coalition-building dynamics: all
senators’ votes are of equal value to the coalition builder, but they are not
equal in price’. This explanation concurs with social choice accounts
showing that local governments with more bargaining (i.e. representational)
power may be favoured in the intergovernmental political game by receiving
more grants (Borck and Owings ; Feld and Schaltegger ).
T : Senate overrepresentation
Gini index of inequality Percentage of seats of best represented decile
Belgium . Belgium .
Austria . Austria .
India . India .
Spain . Spain .
Germany . Germany .
Canada . Australia .
Australia . Canada .
Russia . Russia .
Switzerland . Switzerland .
USA . USA .
Brazil . Brazil .
Argentina . Argentina .
MEAN . MEAN .
Source: Stepan () and own calculations. Higher values denote higher
malapportionment.
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As Table  succinctly shows, senate malapportionment manifests itself
in Argentina more than elsewhere in the world. And its effects are highly
axiomatic: virtually no policy coalition can be put together without the
support of the regional structures of power of sparsely-populated and
economically-underdeveloped provinces. As Remmer and Wibbels ()
demonstrate, subnational interests in Argentina are in a pivotal position
to offer resistance to national policies of economic adjustment because
provinces can make adroit use of territorial representational advantages.
This apparent moral hazard becomes further exacerbated by the fact
that the Argentina Senate over-represents rural, mostly transfer-
dependent provinces. Consequently, malapportionment forecloses policy
reforms to temper the patronage-financed debt spending of Argentine
provinces.
Electoral designs do not only affect Senate representation but they
also reduce the number of effective parties in gubernatorial elections,
minimizing the risk of electoral defeat and hence working to the
advantage of governors in Argentina (Calvo and Micozzi ). In fact,
the country’s electoral rules moves the senators re-election decision
away from the voters’ influence and closer to the whims of the
governors, considering the province-based nature of Argentine political
careers (Jones et al. ). As noted earlier, governors possesses a wide
array of formal powers; consistent with evidence from the US, Argen-
tine governors are endowed with important tools to play a dominant
role in the budgetary process and are something of chief legislators in
policies that affect the intergovernmental distributive game (Lee Ber-
nick ). However, the interplay between malapportionment and
gubernatorial influence is clearly illustrated by the territorial variation
in the number of effective parties. Using data from  to ,
Calvo and Escolar (: ) show that the mean for that period is of
.. A closer look at the figures corresponding to the most over-
represented provinces indicates that they all rank well bellow such
mean: La Rioja (.), Catamarca (.), Santa Cruz (.), and
Formosa (.). In other words, governors from over-represented
provinces are more shielded from local challengers and hence better
equipped, all else equal, than under-represented jurisdictions to influ-
ence the moves of the national senators, who until recently were
appointed through a binomial election system by the provincial
legislatures, which are conspicuously controlled by governors. The
above having been said, it still remains an open question whether the
partisan colour of governors ruling over-represented provinces has a
significant effect on the apportionment of federal grants, a matter that
we seek to sort out in the cross-sectional analysis.
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The politics of intergovernmental transfers in Argentina
At first glance, Argentina appears to have one of the most decentralised
fiscal systems in the world. According to an Inter-American Development
Bank Report (), provinces spend more than  per cent of total
national and provincial expenditures. Yet, since the s, subnational
governments in Argentina have delegated fiscal authority to the federal
level, which collects most taxes. This structural imbalance between
expenditure and revenue assignments is common among federal systems,
inasmuch as revenue-sharing arrangements are commonplace. However,
Argentine provinces receive transfers that are, for the most part, substan-
tially larger than own-tax revenues. These transfers are drawn from the
revenue-sharing system (coparticipacio´n or Federal Tax-Sharing Agree-
ment, henceforth FTSA) and other automatic transfers that are ear-
marked for specific purposes. The levels and parameters of these transfers
have varied substantially over time, constituting an ongoing source of
political strife between federal and provincial levels authorities and, as we
will demonstrate in this paper, among the provinces themselves.
Despite fiscal federalism theory’s emphasis on efficiency and equity
imperatives of the policy of transferring revenue to subnational govern-
ments (Tiebout ; Oates ), we claim that the distribution of
intergovernmental transfer is above all a political issue, because the
amount of resources granted to subnational governments will determine
their viability and success. In turn, this case study shows that the political
tinkering behind fiscal decentralisation policies can be grasped more
precisely when we examine the distribution of seemingly small-scale
grants. Previous studies have used the history of Argentine FTSA to
explore for evidence of the relative effect of economic and political factors
on fiscal decentralisation (Eaton ). However, while FTSA funds are
not earmarked and local politicians can use them to build independent
patronage networks, the bulk of money was given out on a formula or
fixed coefficients basis. Further, after the  restructuring of revenue
sharing, FTSA increasingly lost ground (in relative terms) to other
revenue-sharing funds that target specific purposes (Gordin ). In this
vein, this case study will focus on three intergovernmental transfers
programs, FONAVI (Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda, National Housing
Fund), FEDEI (Fondo de Desarrollo Ele´ctrico del Interior, Electricity Invest-
ment Development Fund), and ATN (Aportes del Tesoro Nacional, National
Treasury Contributions). This case selection is based on the fact that
these funds are based on discretionary transfers, as opposed to automatic
ones that are less vulnerable to political influence. However, while
FONAVI and FEDEI are ideally allocated with the purpose of financing
housing construction and electricity provision infrastructure respectively,
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ATN is used to fill financing gaps, thus is based on discretionary criteria
both in the determination of the total amount to be transferred and
unconditional with respect to allocation. Focusing on these funds,
therefore, allows us to analyze the effect of explanatory political and
economic factors on subnational funds apportionment under diverse
transfer regimes.
In turn, we will examine the extent to which FONAVI and ATN
allocations are politically determined, confronting two competing views
about intergovernmental transfers. In this analysis, we exclude FEDEI
because it has been subjected to numerous changes since its creation,
affecting the consistency of its time-series. However, FEDEI provides the
most appropriate empirical indicator to analyse the cross-section distri-
bution in the  crisis, as it was put through intense media and
oversight scrutiny based on its salient capital-intensive character. Accord-
ingly, one explanation emphasizes the traditional neoclassical approach
to federal-subnational fiscal relations and the alternative model suggests
that transfers are contingent on the political fortunes and current political
vulnerability of each level of government. For that purpose, time-series
analysis is used to account for cross-subnational and diachronic variation
in the distribution of intergovernmental transfers, using macroeconomic,
socio-demographic and political indicators as explanatory factors.
The theoretical framework for this analysis consists of a set of
hypotheses positing relationships among these independent variables and
the subnational allocations of FONAVI and ATN grants. This dependent
variable measures the yearly changes in the distribution of these funds to
provincial administrations from  to  and from  to . Note
that we use change proportions rather than monetary changes to avoid
cumbersome adjustments due to frequent currency reforms adopted in
Argentina. As we use pooled data, the unit of analysis is province/year.
This time frame conforms with the interruption of democratic rule
between  and , a period in which the military shut down the
legislature and banned all political parties. That having been said, this is
the longest time-series ever used to study the unfolding of fiscal
decentralisation in Argentina. Following Beck and Katz ()’s recom-
mendation for PCSE analysis that includes some relatively time-invariant
independent variables, all models include an AR1 correction. The
appendix provides a list of data sources used to compile all variables.
Competing hypotheses
The economic context
The traditional economic policy view of intergovernmental transfers is
that such grants are made to enhance macroeconomic efficiency and
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fiscal equalisation among provinces (Oates ). This approach sees
central government agents as ‘ benevolent’ insofar as they prioritize the
advancement of public welfare over their private (i.e. political and
utility-maximizing) interest. In principle, government seeks to offset
externalities and other market imperfections, thus it aims to match grants
to jurisdictional needs and capabilities.
The distribution of funds across provinces is determined using various
indicators reflecting the evolution of the demand for public services.
Population is then a critical consideration in this regard. Basically a
demand-driven program, FONAVI is directly affected by population
figures. While there is apparently a linear and positive relationship
between FONAVI allocations and housing needs, it can be argued that
other macroeconomic conditions affect this relationship. For instance,
provincial unemployment levels are relevant because individuals who
have no income are unlikely to take on mortgage commitments and
would probably reside in rented housing. Hence, we should control for
the impact of unemployment, which will be subsequently analyzed in the
next hypothesis. This variable is measured using population figures based
on available census data.
As indicated above, unemployment is included to control for the
existence of an active counter-cyclical fiscal policy, which might be at the
core of demands for greater intergovernmental transfers. Considering
that levels of unemployment tend to diverge dramatically across
Argentine provinces, it is important to see whether they demarcate
the manner in which FONAVI and ATN transfers are doled out.
Unemployment is measured as the provincial unemployment rate in
percentages.
Provincial own revenue is usually positively related to the value of the
regional economic capacity, generally measured in terms of gross
domestic product (GDP). The availability of relatively reliable data on
regional GDP allows us to test the impact of this variable on the
distribution of intergovernmental transfers. Previous work on fiscal
performance of Argentine provinces shows that energy consumption, a
factor often used as a proxy for economic development, does not have
any significant effect on provincial public sector spending (Jones et al.
). However, provincial economic capacity bolsters demand for
housing and certainly affects the need of financial assistance, thus we
expect a significant relationship between provincial GDP and the selected
federal transfers. Geographical GDP is measured as the per capita
provincial GDP converted into Pesos, June .
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The political context
Arguments under this rubric hold that utility-maximizing politicians will
use intergovernmental transfers to advance their own private (political)
interests, thus questions of efficiency and social welfare are surface
phenomena. Instead, one must understand the incentives politicians at all
levels of government face and the resulting political relationships between
national and subnational politicians. These incentives stem from electoral
institutions, party competition, and most fundamentally, coalition-
building. That is, intergovernmental bargaining in the political market
takes the center stage.
In a widely cited study, Riker and Schaps () argued that if the
executive officials of the central and constituent governments are
controlled by the same party, then they might be expected to reduce the
level of conflict within a federation by enhancing centralising moves. In
turn, whether governors belong to a political party which is similar or
different to that of the president is a major influence in the unfolding of
intergovernmental fiscal relations. In the Argentine context, governor-
ships are by far the most important office at the provincial level and the
way in which negotiations between the national and provincial executives
evolves is seen as determinant of decentralising policies (Falletti ;
Jones et al. ). Further, considering that many policies of the central
government that require legislation to give them effect involve a coalition
that is broader than the members of the incumbent party alone,
presidents seek to capture the other parties’ governors’ support. The
latter, largely unaffected by incumbent’s intra-party rules and the effect
of legislative party discipline, are likely to behave in an opportunistic
manner, trying to extract higher transfer payments from the national
government than governors from the president’s party would. Partisan
disharmony is assessed using a dummy variable indicating whether the
provincial governor belongs to a party that is different from that of the
president.
While two-party presidentialism has been the hallmark of Argentine
national politics throughout the last century, provincial parties became
meaningful actors at the subnational level. This development is crucial
for understanding the evolution of intergovernmental transfers given the
fact that some regions have regional-party dominant systems providing
them advantages over regions with higher levels of electoral volatility.
Previous research has shown that, with few exceptions, national politi-
cians have used fiscal transfers to strengthen the allegiance of provincial
party leaders (Gibson ; Remmer and Wibbels ). This patronage-
driven mechanism derives from provincial parties’ fewer opportunities to
obtain discretionary resources than their mainstream challengers at the
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regional level. In many respects, it is not too far-fetched to argue that
long-standing dominance of provincial bosses on regional politics has
translated into lavish transfers to their respective regions to the detriment
of provinces more susceptible to electoral manipulation. In a country
where governors act as agents of the president, such channelling of
financial support to provincial parties-dominated regions seems to be a
price worth being paid. This variable is measured using a dummy
variable indicating whether the provincial executive is controlled by a
provincial party.
Tables  and  present the coefficients of the equations estimating
FONAVI and ATN transfers to provinces, respectively. Before we
proceed to discuss the findings for each political factor, it becomes
apparent that partisan considerations are major shaping influences in the
T : Determinants of Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda transfers
Independent variables z p<.
Intercept . .
Population . .
Unemployment . .
Geographical GDP . .
Provincial Party Governor  . .
Partisan Disharmony . .
Note: Analysis is by Panel-corrected standard errors regression with an AR1
correction. The dependent variable is yearly changes in the distribution of
FONAVI transfers to provinces from  to  and from  to .
N = . R = .. Wald Chi = . (prob>chi = .). Entries are
panel-corrected standardized coefficients.
Source: The data come from the Ministry of Economy (Buenos Aires, Argentina),
Molinelli et al. (), and own calculations.
T : Determinants of Aportes del Tesoro Nacional transfers
Independent variables z p<.
Intercept  . .
Population  . .
Unemployment . .
Geographical GDP – . .
Provincial Party Governor  . .
Partisan Disharmony . .
Note: Analysis is by Panel-corrected standard errors regression with an AR1
correction. The dependent variable is yearly changes in the distribution of ATN
transfers to provinces from  to  and from  to . N = .
R = .. Wald Chi = . (prob>chi = .). Entries are panel-corrected
standardized coefficients.
Source: As in Table .
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unfolding of these transfers, as they withstand the inclusion of decisive
socio-demographic and economic variables. If in fact grants are doled out
to address equity and/or efficiency issues, political factors should not be
so conspicuously present. Beyond providing preliminary evidence to
advance a political theory of decentralisation, these general findings
challenge the basic postulates of the normative theory of intergovern-
mental transfers and its emphasis on fiscal equity and efficiency as key
building blocks. The major stylized fact emerging from this analysis is
that economic imperatives are necessary but not suﬃcient conditions to
account for variation in FONAVI and ATN transfers at the light of the
consistent and significant effect of the partisan disharmony factor. This
strong and consistent relationship between partisan variables and the
ability of provincial governments to increase their share of federal funds
corresponds with preliminary evidence offered by Willis et al. (), who
argue that party system factors define levels of fiscal decentralization in
Latin America.
Turning first to our partisan disharmony variable, Riker and Schaps’
intuition does provide a solid ground to fully explain FONAVI and ATN
transfers, at the light of its sign direction and statistical significance.
Consistent with previous findings, it is shown that when governorships
are ruled by opposition parties, the overall amount of (total) federal funds
transferred to the provinces increases considerably (Gordin ). The
overall amount of FONAVI transfers hinges on bilateral bargaining
between the central government and each province, enhancing the
political clout of governors. This bilateral bargaining generates a zero-sum
game dynamics among governors and bolsters the territorial aspects of
interest representation and bargaining vis-a`-vis partisan interests. Adding
to this, the federal government coalition is often confronted with a
majority of provincial governments composed of opposition parties in the
Senate. As the President Alfonsin’s administration, particularly since
, evidently highlights, the incumbent federal government may be
forced to buy political support of provinces governed by the Peronist
Party in the upper house. Further, the ‘ catch-all’ nature of Argentina’s
mainstream parties, the Peronist Party and the UCR, leads to intra-party
confrontations because these parties embrace quite distinct factions.
Confirming the theses of scholars who call attention to the ‘ executive’
nature of Argentine federalism (Pirez ), partisan disharmony be-
tween the national and provincial level captures the diversity of political
interactions affecting the selected intergovernmental transfers programs.
Regarding the political influence of a governorship controlled by a
provincial party, we found no support for the hypothesized effect in
Argentina, as this variable is statistically insignificant for FONAVI and
ATN transfers. One possible explanation for this finding stems from the
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ideological orientation of Argentine provincial parties, mostly clustered at
the center-right and thus closer to the Peronist Party. In the last  years
covered in this study, provincial parties have massively supported the
candidacy of Carlos Menem and his subsequent attempt to cut down 
per cent in the primary distribution of FTSA to the provinces to finance
the proposed nationalization of the social security system. An additional
cause of this seemingly minor role played by the provincial parties’ czars
stems from their progressive ambitions, insofar as provincial governor-
ships in Argentina are strategic springboards to attain national leverage,
buttressing their prospects to run in subsequent presidential elections as
candidates. In this light, governors from provincial parties seek to cast a
fiscally-responsible image and conceal, to the extent possible, their
clientelist and opportunistic streak.
The inter-provincial distribution of intergovernmental transfers
: An illustrative case-study
The preceding results for FONAVI and ATN apportionment are
consistent with the so-called politico-economic ‘ partisan model’ of
elected officials from competing parties, who safeguard their political
destiny through public provision. Having revealed that the political
determination of transfers is consistently high, it is necessary now to
examine whether over-represented provinces are rewarded compared to
provinces with higher fiscal capacity. For that purpose, we will use
cross-section analysis of transfers to provinces in . This year
epitomizes the beginning of a period in which provincial administrations
were pushed to modernize their public administrations systems, reform
the structure of provincial taxes, and, more importantly, improve their
own-resource mobilization.
The analysis of the inter-provincial distribution of federal funds in 
offers an interesting case to examine the extent to which over-represented
(mostly economically disadvantaged) provinces can tilt their share of
transfers at a time when financial imperatives were expected to reduce
subnational fiscal autonomy. This year amounts to a ‘ critical juncture’
that was expected to reduce the manoeuvring margin of poor provinces
to retain a lion’s share of federal transfers, providing a useful testing
ground of extreme fiscal conditions. More specifically, this year repre-
sents a crossroad of the beginning of the demise of the Convertibility
Plan, the Mexican Crisis in late , and the lagging effects of the 
and  Fiscal Pacts.
 Jorge P. Gordin
The convertibility plan
Seen as the only remedy to curb hyperinflation, the  Convertibility
law forbade the Central Bank from using the money supply to finance the
public deficit, and money creation was permitted only to the extent that
international (i.e. US dollars) reserves were increased. While this plan
helped to increase provincial revenue, expenditures quickly accommo-
dated and provincial deficits grew from . per cent of GPD in  to
. per cent in  (World Bank : ). This overall unsustainable level
of debt has not swayed provinces’ attempts to resort to financing
operations such as borrowing from their official banks and issuing
‘ coupons’ in lieu of wage payments.
The ‘ tequila’ eﬀect
The above-mentioned weaknesses of the new monetary regime were
underscored after the Mexican crisis in late . Following the collapse
of the Mexican currency, Argentina’s monetary base shrank sharply
(almost  per cent, a reduction comparable to that experienced by the
United States in the  crisis). This resulted in numerous deposit losses
that threatened to bankrupt the provincial banks. To avoid massive
defaults, many provincial banks, mostly from peripheral provinces, were
privatised, amounting to a (re) centralisation of intergovernmental fiscal
relations (Eaton and Dickovick : ).
The  and  Fiscal Pacts
Touted as potential watersheds in the reform of fiscal federalism in
Argentina, the Pactos Fiscales were negotiated bilaterally with provincial
governors to reduce provincial revenue shares and the transfer of key
expenditures responsibilities (education, health, and housing) without the
corresponding revenue resources. In a nutshell, President Menem sought
to replace the automatic (i.e. decentralising) distribution criteria for
FTSA funds legislated in  with selectively induced benefits to
compliant governors. In , they negotiated to reroute  per cent of
the revenues slated to be transferred to provincial governments toward
the national social security system, which was on the verge of bankruptcy.
To offset this concession, provinces obtained transfers with a minimum
amount guaranteed. Defiant provinces (e.g. Entre Rı´os, Chaco, Jujuy)
were selectively punished with no payments, until they gave in. Echoing
the political-ridden character of this pact, Menem signed a second fiscal
pact in  with governors aimed at deregulating and reducing/
eliminating provincial taxes that affect enterprise and employment costs.
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This move was a ‘ token of appreciation’ to the business sector, to limit
the autonomy of the governors to set their own tax bases and fine-tune
the provincial tax systems to mirror the neoliberal reforms Menem had
implemented at the national level. Facing seven governors refusing to
sign, selective debt relief and, mostly, federal infrastructure investments
were used by the national government to marshal subnational support. In
summary, beyond the nature of the issues addressed in each fiscal pact,
a recurrent thread in Menem’s moves has been to weaken coordination
among provinces and deepen federal controls over subnational revenue
to preclude provincial expansion of public spending and thus strengthen
their own patronage networks.
Cross-sectional analysis
Based on this sketch of the fiscal scene in , and its concomitant
constraints on inter-provincial capacity to join ranks and oppose the
federal executive’s moves, what kind of provinces succeeded in attracting
a larger share of federal transfers? In order to answer this question, we
investigate the distribution of FEDEI transfers to provinces in that year.
As argued previously, a cross-section model is more appropriate to zoom
in on the context set out above. Unlike the previous empirical analysis,
malapportionment is employed here as an explanatory factor. Based on
our previous claim linking malapportionment and gubernatorial influ-
ence, this independent variable consists in the interaction term of
provincial over-representation and governorships held by parties that
oppose the incumbent national executive. This, in turn, will be our
approach to uncover the extent of politicisation in the distribution of
transfers and our main independent variable. Drawing on Porto and
Sanguinetti (), we calculate malapportionment by dividing the fixed
number of senators per province (which during the period analyzed here
is equal to two) by population. Based on the qualitative evidence
presented above, we expect this factor to be positively associated with
federal transfers, which is to say, over-represented provinces will receive
a higher share of funds. To control for the impact of transfer dependency,
we will use an indicator of provincial financial capacity, which is the
revenue/expenditure flexibility variable and operationalised as the
provincially-generated revenue as a percentage of total revenue.
Thus we estimate the following model:
FEDEI = B + bPopulation + bUnemployment +
bRevenue/Expenditure Flexibility + bPartisan Disharmony +
bOver-represented Provinces ruled by Opposition Governor +
b Provincial Party Governor + e
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The results are reported in Table . The support in favour of the
malapportionment variable is strong and its coefficient is robust and
carries the expected sign. This trend is further illustrated in Figure ,
where it becomes apparent that the actual inter-provincial distribution
fits the regression line. Figure  presents a scatter plot where it is clear
that La Rioja looms large as the outlier. This province not only ranks as
T : Determinants of Fondo de Desarrollo Ele´ctrico del Interior
transfers
Independent variables Coefficient t
Intercept . .
Population . .
Unemployment  .  .
Revenue/Expenditure Flexibility  .  .
Partisan Disharmony . .
Over-represented (Opposition) Province .** .
Provincial Party Governor . .
Note: Analysis is by OLS regression analysis. The dependent variable is yearly
changes in the distribution of FEDEI transfers to provinces in . N = .
R = .. Entries are standardized coefficients.
**Significant at the . level (-tailed test).
Source: As in Table .
F : Malappropriament and expenditure
Source: The data come from the Ministry of Economy (Buenos Aires,
Argentina), Molinelli et al (), and own calculations.
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one of the most over-represented provinces in Argentina but also its
political dynamics stands out as a crucial parameter. The political
trajectory of Carlos Menem, its three times governor from the main
opposition party and subsequently elected president in  and
re-elected to the presidency in , accounts for the sheer increase in
grant apportionment to this province. This patronage-ridden context was
increasingly gaining institutional sustainability since the  electoral
reform that introduced a PR-D’Hont formula and increased the number
of seats distributed in the rural districts of La Rioja, which were mostly
Peronist strongholds (Calvo and Micozzi : ).
These preliminary findings are consistent with historical records about
the secondary distribution of intergovernmental transfers. Rezk (:
, ) shows that ever since revenue-sharing was implemented for the
first time in  a gradual trend in favor of over-represented, mostly
poor provinces, with the singular exception of oil-producing Santa Cruz,
is conspicuous. While under-represented and high-revenue provinces like
Buenos Aires, Santa Fe´, and Co´rdoba experienced a decrease of  per
cent, low-revenue provinces were benefited with an increase of  per
cent. Likewise, Sawers (: ) argues that ‘ in , when federal
assistance was minimal, the most advanced provinces (Buenos Aires,
Co´rdoba, Santa Fe´, and Mendoza) spent five times per capita what the
most backward provinces spent (La Rioja, Catamarca, Corrientes, Jujuy,
Misiones, Chaco, Santiago, and Formosa). By , they were spending
F : Relationship between Fondo de Desarrollo Ele´ctrico del Interior alloca-
tions and malapportionment
Source: As in Figure .
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roughly the same amount per capita. By the mid-s, the poorest
provinces were spending almost twice what the most prosperous
provinces spent on each citizen’. The political correlate of this redirecting
of economic resources toward the development of backward provinces is
the historical alliance among elites from poor provinces and a strong and
autonomous central government to prevent one province’s (i.e. Buenos
Aires) dominating the others in Argentina. This intersection of interests
was formalized through the creation of institutions such as the Senate and
the Electoral College that elected the president. Provincial governments
moved to the center stage, playing an important role in deciding who gets
sent to Congress. National senators until recently were chosen by
provincial legislatures, not by popular vote. Thus, control over provincial
governments means control over the national senate and veto power over
fiscal decentralisation legislation (Botana : ).
Conclusion
This study makes the case that subnational fiscal relations are largely
dictated by the tension between the territorial distribution of political
resources and the territorial distribution of economic structure. Inter-
regional economic asymmetries, which manifest themselves in the degree
of transfer-dependency of subnational governments, intertwine with
political asymmetries derived from legislative overrepresentation of
territorial units and intergovernmental bargaining strategies. That is,
poorly populated, mostly economically disadvantaged and thus transfer-
dependent regions can bring into play their political overrepresentation
to shield themselves from unwanted reforms to increase their fiscal
autonomy. The effect of regional power asymmetries on the allocation of
revenue and revenue authority is mediated by a major influence: extreme
levels of overrepresentation and policy scope of the Senate. In Argentina,
the sorting out of subnational fiscal relations is ‘ locked-in’ at the senate
level, where peripheral provinces are overrepresented. This balance of
power shields the latter from the political hurdles and fiscal responsibili-
ties derived from own-revenue mobilisation, it perpetuates fiscal centrali-
sation based on intergovernmental transfers, and, ultimately, it engenders
a fiscal policy regime based on cooptation and patronage. Federalism and
its concomitant institutional protection of the autonomy of subnational
units can at times, as transpires from the Argentine experience, have
perverse effects on fiscal performance. Despite federalism’s ostensible
‘ market-preserving’ quality (Weingast ), deadlocked and malfunc-
tioning federal institutions can lead to economic catastrophes.
In focusing on the tension between the territorial distribution of
political resources and the territorial distribution of economic structure,
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another implication also poses daunting challenges to the fiscal federalism
scholarship. This tension exacerbates the politicisation of intergovern-
mental fiscal relations and, what is more, it becomes palpable in the
mutually-reinforcing relationship between decentralisation and regional-
ised patronage. While the conventional wisdom in the subject that sees
distributive politics as a mere residual issue, namely that it plays no role
in the determination of fiscal decentralisation reforms or, ever worse, that
patronage is doomed to wither away once fiscal decentralisation evolves,
exactly the contrary is argued in this study. The policy of transferring
revenue and revenue authority to subnational governments not only
renders possible the entrenchment of patronage-ridden regional enclaves
but, also, the latter can exploit institutional and political opportunities to
sabotage fiscal decentralisation projects.
Last, this work shows that the presence of formal governmental
structures to represent territorial interests does not necessarily mean they
are effective in practice. A highly ‘ institutionalised’ senate in Argentina
shields the political and economic interests of poorly-developed, yet
politically powerful, provinces. As these provinces are co-opted in the
legislative process at a more ‘ convenient’ price than metropolitan
regions, regional asymmetries in the allocation of revenue and revenue
authority are sustained over time. Therefore, any policy recommenda-
tion for fiscal reforms in decentralised polities should consider that the
timing and sequencing of fiscal and political decentralisation reforms are
of essence. For instance, the putative fiscal benefits of decentralisation to
disadvantaged areas are rendered moot, when the amount of transfers to
them is dictated by political influence beyond social welfare. In this
regard, our study highlights the geographical uneven nature of fiscal
reforms and how liberal, efficiency-enhancing decentralisation policies
can be blocked by the concomitant entrenchment of patronage-ridden,
politically-shielded regional enclaves. The Argentine experience suggests
that the relationship between the provinces and their budgets and the
central government cannot be sorted out from the effect of political
institutions and their related regional power asymmetries. If this is
correct, institutional reforms in areas such as electoral malapportionment
should be contemporaneous with, or even precede, fiscal decentralisation
reforms.
NOTES
. Alberta Sbragia, B. Guy Peters, William Keech and Louis Picard provided many helpful comments
on an earlier version of this article. Likewise, I wish to thank James Alt for clarifying my thoughts
on many issues raised in this work. For comments and suggestions, I am also grateful to the
participants of the workshop ‘Elections and Democracy in Latin America’ at the ECPR Joint
Sessions of Workshops, Granada, Spain, April –, . Any opinion, findings, or conclusions
expressed in this article are those of the author.
 Jorge P. Gordin
. By the mid-s, subnational administrations (including the municipal level) collected less than 
per cent of the total taxes collected in Argentina (Piffano in Sawers : ).
. Previous studies use small data sets with cross-section averages for only  years (Stein ) or
time-series for a period of only  years (Rezk ).
. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this approach to the analysis.
. For instance, the unemployment rate (average for the observed period) in Mendoza is . per cent
compared to a . per cent in Tucuman (INDEC).
. Throughout these years, the incumbent UCR only held a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, and
only until , when Peronism assumed the majority of this chamber. Peronists exploited a
constitutional clause that all revenue-sharing bills must originate in the National Senate and blocked
the passing of badly needed revenue-sharing law reforms. Alfonsin manipulated this legislative
vacuum by resorting to ATN transfers to compensate for provincial fiscal shortfalls.
. We exclude geographical GDP because it is strongly correlated (about  per cent and statistically
significant) with the revenue/expenditure factor and thus induces to multicollinearity.
. To test whether the OLS results in Table , which are based on a relatively limited N, are biased
due to the presence of outliers, we run the same OLS regression including La Rioja as dummy
variable and got similar results with regards to significance and sign direction. Put differently,
omitting the extreme case of La Rioja does not change the overall results and the substantive
findings.
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APPENDIX
Data and Sources
Dependent variables Source
FONAVI (National Housing
Fund)
MECON, Ejecucio´n Presupuestaria
FEDEI (Electricity Dependent
Fund)
MECON, Ejecucio´n Presupuestaria
ATN (Federal Treasury
Contribution)
MECON, Ejecucio´n Presupuestaria
Independent variables
Population INDEC, Censo
Unemployment INDEC, Anuario Estadı´stico
Geographical GDP Elı´as ()
Malapportionment Porto and Sanguinetti ()
Partisan Disharmony Fraga (), Molinelli, Palanza,
and Sin ()
Provincial Party Governor Fraga (), Molinelli, Palanza,
and Sin ()
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